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MEDICAID GOVERNANCE IN THE WAKE
OF NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V SEBELIUS:
FINDING FEDERALISM'S MIDDLE
PATHWAY, FROM ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TO STATE COMPACTS
JOHN D. BLUM* AND GAYLAND

I.

0. HETHCOAT II**

INTRODUCTION

"Keep your government hands off my Medicare" is a phrase
that echoed through the summer of 2009 in town-hall meetings in
1
which public outrage over health reform was the news of the day.
Interestingly enough, there were no signs imploring politicians not
to legislate away the other major public health insurance program:
Medicaid. As the story of health reform unfolds, however, it is this
program that lies at the epicenter of controversy over health
reform. 2 The dispute over Medicaid is not driven by passions of the
citizenry about loss of benefits but by a fight within the halls of
government concerning the dramatic expansion and restructuring
of the program contained in the Affordable Care Act (ACA),3 the
reform legislation that Congress passed in 2010. The challenge to
the Medicaid expansion rests on the oddities of public health
insurance governance and raises disputes about federalism, a
somewhat perennial battleground of American jurisprudence,
which, not surprisingly, has followed us into the twenty-first
century. 4

* John J. Waldron Professor of Law, Beazley Institute for Health Law and
Policy, Loyola University Chicago.
** JD, LLM. Fellow, Beazley Institute for Health Law and Policy, Loyola
University Chicago.
1. Paul Krugman, Why Americans Hate Single-Payer Insurance, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 2009, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/28/whyamericans-hate-single-payer-insurance/.
2. Benjamin D. Sommers & Arnold M. Epstein, Medicaid Expansion-The
Soft Underbelly of Health Reform?, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2085, 2085-2087
(2010).
3. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 2001-2955, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029.
4. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT:
FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2008).
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The Medicaid claim heard by the U.S. Supreme Court arose in
the mire of details and complexities in the pages of the ACA
legislation, as well as those in the even more voluminous
accompanying regulations. Clearly, disputes over laws as complex
as ACA are to be expected, but they generally unfold as a type of
legal trench warfare sparked by regulatory matters of
implementation. The legal battles over ACA, however, go well
beyond administrative law details and reach core aspects of the
law's insurance reform scheme.5 Nagging doubts about the
constitutionality of the ACA insurance expansion have moved from
the margins to the mainstream, fueled by emotions and politics,
reflective of the passionate seniors at the town halls in 2009, but
also driven by sophisticated legal considerations.6 The details of
the constitutional challenges to ACA were layered and nuanced,
and the merits of the issues that the courts have heard have
passed from being casually marginalized in legal circles to
sparking serious angst about how public health insurance reform
can proceed, in light of the majority ruling in National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius.7
As ACA has moved beyond the realms of statutory and
administrative law and into the arena of federal litigation, the
merits of the legal challenges coalesced around two primary
issues: the constitutionality of the minimum essential coverage
provision, or the "individual mandate" to acquire health insurance,
under the Commerce Clause,8 and the expansion of Medicaid
under the General Welfare Clause.9 Both of the challenges touched
on the core elements of the health reform initiative, which are
essential to the architecture of universal coverage. Undoubtedly,
the individual mandate has received broader consideration, as it
has been the focal point of contention in the federal cases leading
up to the Supreme Court's review, and ultimately the Court ruling
that the mandate stands as a valid exercise of federal taxing
power.10 Although the jurisprudential intricacies must be
5.
FOR

Kevin Arts & Bill Erwin, Legal Challenges to Health Reform, ALLIANCE
HEALTH

REFORM

(May

18,

2010),

http://www.allhealth.org/publications/Uninsured/LegalChallenges-toNew_H
ealthReformLaw_97.pdf.
6. Id.; see also Ian Urbina, Beyond Beltway, Health Reform Turns Hostile,
7,
2009,
Aug.
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/us/politics/08townhall.html? _r=1.
7. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, No.11-393,
slip. op (U.S. June 28, 2012). For historic reference, see Stephanie Stapleton,
Back-Up Plans for the Individual Mandate?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 6,
2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/september/06/individualmandate-round-robin.aspx (providing differing opinions).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
10. Betsy Goldman, Justice Kennedy and Obamacare: In Which Direction
Will He Swing?, BLOOMBERG LAW REPS., Jan. 25, 2012.
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distinguished in considering the merits of these issues, there are
overarching connections between them, namely the legal propriety
of the exercise of federal power in the area of health insurance
generally. This underlying constitutional theme is embedded in
the question of whether Congress can exert its powers to force
individual and state actors alike to comply with requirements that
expand health insurance coverage to thirty-two million citizens,
moving close to the elusive goal of universal coverage-the bedrock
of ACA, and the determining factor of the success of the historic
legislation.
This Article evolves from one side of the ACA Supreme Court
case, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
namely the challenge mounted by several states concerning their
obligation to expand Medicaid coverage by raising eligibility
standards to 133 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL), which
is arguably the most significant element of ACA.11 Here, the
Supreme Court finding of merit in the state argument of coercion
was even more stunning than its upholding of the mandate on
taxing power grounds.12 The inquiry in this Article touches on
details of the Medicaid "coercion" claim considered by the Court as
a backdrop to a broader discussion concerning federalism and the
future of state regulation in health care-a matter shaped not only
by law, but variables not easily controlled by law or Washington,
in particular the economic realities faced by state government. It
is difficult to write about the long term impacts of a Court ruling
when the ink has barely dried: as confronting the black and white
of the actual ruling will be a process that will likely unfold over
several years. While no doubt, the decision in National Federation
and its unfolding details will inevitably reinforce the grand caveat
that no one, lawyer and layperson alike, should neither second
guess the U.S. Supreme Court nor draw hasty conclusions about
how Court jurisprudence will impact machinations of government
policy. It is not, the intent of this Article to offer a lengthy analysis
of the Medicaid aspects of the National Federation case. Rather,
this Article builds on the opinion as a springboard for a
consideration of the federalism issue, one that proposes
fundamental reforms to the current structures of health
governance in the contexts of Medicaid and federal-state relations
in this sector more broadly. While it may be startling to
11. For an excellent overview of the Medicaid expansion in ACA, see Renee
M. Landers & Patrick A. Leeman, Medicaid Expansion Under the 2010 Health
Care Reform Legislation: The ContinuingEvolution of Medicaid's Central Role
in American Health Care, 7 NAELA J. 143 (2011). See also Chris Edwards,
Medicaid Reforms, Downsizing the Federal Government, CATO INST. (Sept.
2010),
http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/hss/medicaid-reforms
(discussing the costs that will take place in the coming years).
12. NationalFederation,No.11-393, slip. op at 45-57.
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constitutional scholars that the coercion claim in National
Federation succeeded, the long-term challenge for ACA is the
emerging need to restructure the federal-state relationship to meet
the legislative goals of expanding health insurance to the poor. 13
This Article is composed of four parts. The first part explores
health reform from a broad perspective, considering the array of
goals and key elements in ACA, which, when pieced together,
aspire for universal coverage. The second part discusses the status
of Medicaid, a program that lies at the middle of the federalism
debate, and whose future will determine the success or failure of
ACA. The third part reflects on the legal argument that the
Medicaid expansion in ACA violates Congress's constitutional taxand-spend power, which is noteworthy not only for its legal basis
but also its potential to usher in a broader exploration of the
duality of health governance. The fourth part proposes how
Medicaid reform can move forward, beyond the parameters of
combative federalism and the confines of the present
constitutional ruling over Medicaid, positing considerations to
better balance public health governance, and with luck goes
beyond the mere proverbial shifting of deck chairs.
II. HEALTH REFORM OBSERVATIONS: THE BACKDROP
ACA charts an ambitious course in federal health policy,
building on the many facets of public health insurance that have
emerged over the past seventy-five years.14 Although the ten titles
that make up ACA cut across a wide variety of issues and
programs, the core of this effort is to address the problem of the
uninsured through an individual mandate, a series of coverage
reforms, and notably a major expansion of the Medicaid program. 15
Since its enactment two years ago, ACA has had a significant
effect not only on health law and regulation, but also on the
marketplace of health delivery.' 6 In particular, the impacts of ACA
are evident in both the hospital industry and the practice of
medicine."
13. Jonathan Cohn, New Republic: The Underminded Medicaid
Expansion?,
NATIONAL
PUBLIC
RADIO
(July
2,
2012),
new-republic-the-underminedhttp://www.npr.org/2012/07/02/156105350/
medicaid-expansion.
14. JOHN E. McDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 1-100
(2011).
15. Id. at 101-55.
16. Jon Stewart, Experts Say Health Reform Has Its Own Momentum,
Observations, KAISER PERMANENTE INST. FOR HEALTH POL'Y (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://www.kpinstituteforhealthpolicy.org/kpihp/frmContent.aspx?CMSEntry
Id=319&ContentType=H.
17. Id. See generally THE PHYSICIANS FOUND., HEALTH REFORM AND THE
DECLINE
OF
PHYSICIAN
PRIVATE
PRACTICE
(2010),
http://www.merritthawkins.com/uploadedFiles/
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On its face, ACA is not a grand vision of health care. Rather,
the legislation constitutes a series of initiatives, or smaller visions,
which collectively facilitate a new, albeit expanded, network of
insurance coverage. The policy objectives of ACA are best captured
by the operating plans of the law's chief bureaucratic agent, the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). In the
agency's 2010-2015 strategic plan, DHHS Secretary Kathleen
Sebelius identified fixing the nation's broken health insurance
system as the agency's primary health goal, clearly mirroring what
can be extrapolated from ACA as its most basic purpose.18 To this
end, the agency enumerated six objectives, all of which emerge
from the pages of ACA and could, in fact, be labeled as a
restatement of the legislation's core objectives. These objectives
are (1) making coverage more secure for those who have health
insurance and extending it to the uninsured, (2) improving health
care quality and patient safety, (3) strengthening primary and
preventive care, (4) reducing health care costs, (5) better serving
vulnerable populations, and (6) adopting "meaningful use" of
health information technologies (IT).'9 While development of
health IT is more fully articulated in the Hi-Tech Act provisions of
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, it is a vital element
in the architecture of reform efforts, and must be seen as a critical
component of public and private health insurance reform. 20 In a
broader sense, the objectives can be seen together as an
affirmation of the governmental commitment to a public health
insurance system. And that commitment-a type of social
contract-becomes far more critical to ACA's success than
implementation of any one set of details.
But details do matter, and in ACA's case, they are abundant
and complex, unfolding in a massive piece of legislation that must
be assessed in reference to an array of prior laws, and the broad
federal and state structures developed for health care and
insurance alike. ACA's primary features can be viewed as a series
of measures that roll out a string of regulations, which lead to the
end point of coverage expansion and along the way create a floor

MerrittHawkins/Pdf/mhafoundationwhitepapcondens.pdf.
18. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUmAN SERVS., STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL
YEARS

2010-2015

(2012),

http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/about/stratplan-fy2010-15.pdf (explaining that
the federal Departments of Treasury and Labor, as well as state departments
of health and insurance play Key roles in ACA).
19. Id. at 16. See also Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Center for Medicaid
and State Operations, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., to State Health
Officials and State Medicaid Dirs. (April 9, 2010), available at
http://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archiveddownloads/SMDL/downloads/SMD10005.PDF (detailing individual coverage
options under Medicaid made possible by the ACA).
20. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 17935 (2012).
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for system reform. The most direct way to achieve a general
understanding of ACA is to chart the legislation over its ten titles.
For purposes of this Article, the key sections of expansion fall into
two titles. Title I contains the temporary reforms that immediately
addressed access and funding needs of targeted groups, such as
young adults and early retirees. 2 1 But the heart of Title I lies in
four key reforms: (1) an individual insurance mandate; (2) a
guaranteed issue requirement, which bans the use of preexisting
condition exclusions in health insurance policies; (3) premium and
cost-sharing subsidies for low-income people; and (4) state-based
insurance purchasing collectives, known as exchanges. It is
estimated that Title I expansions will result in health insurance
coverage for half of the uninsured population. 22 Title II-the heart
of this Article-mandates an expansion of the state Medicaid
programs to poor people with less than an income set at 133
percent of the federal poverty level.19 The Title II expansion is
dramatic in that it extends Medicaid to uncovered individuals
typically not covered by the program, in particular poor, childless
adults. This portion of ACA accounts for the expansion of health
insurance to as many as twenty million people.23
21. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§§ 1101-1105, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).

22. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Title II, Pub. L. No. 111148 (2010).
23. See Roni Caryn Rabin, With Expanded Coverage for the Poor, Fears of a
Big
Headache,
N.Y.
TIMES
Apr.
26,
2010,
(discussing
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/health/271andscape.html
concerns over Title II). As to the other titles in ACA, Title III deals with
Medicare, mandating major cuts in the program over ten years; the creation of
a cost review panel, the Independent Payment Advisory Board; and increased
drug payments for seniors, thereby shrinking the Medicare Part D donut hole.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Title III, Pub. L. No. 111-148
(2010). In addition, Title III allows Medicare enrollees to obtain coverage for
preventive services without co-pays or deductibles. Id. Public health is the
centerpiece of Title IV, which creates a $15 billion fund to spur investments in
a range of population health initiatives. Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Title IV, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010). Title V is directed toward the
health care workforce, with a focus on the expansion of primary care
providers. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Title V, Pub. L. No.
111-148 (2010). Title V expands enrollment in the National Health Service
Corps program, which provides debt relief to medical students, and increases
funding for community health centers. Id. Title VI focuses primarily on efforts
to expand Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse controls. Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Title VI, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010). Title VII
expands the authority of the Food and Drug Administration to enable the
agency to more effectively regulate the manufacture, marketing, and sale of
biosimilar products. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Title VII,
Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010). Title VIII, a long-term care insurance program
(the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports), has been the first
portion of ACA to be scrapped, as the Obama Administration could not
guarantee that premium support would be adequate for the seventy-five-year
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Beyond discernment of the broad objectives in health reform
and key factors in ACA's titles, another perspective on the law can
be garnered, in even broader terms, as it relates to health
insurance. That is, ACA fails to contain a distinct vision of health
and lacks a single, integrated national health insurance plan. In
fact, the law is a rejection of the long-standing effort on the part of
some in the health policy community to create a uniform, singlepayer system, as well as a new public option plan for the
uninsured. 24 Nevertheless, the law endeavors toward the goal of
offering most Americans primary and acute-care health care
coverage by maintaining existing coverage and building new
avenues for coverage, which, with the exception of the health
insurance exchanges, rest on existing coverage platforms. Thus,
ACA is an elaborate webbing of public and private health
insurance, a scheme in four parts, tying together coverage based
on Medicare, Medicaid, employer-sponsored health insurance, and
expanded private-sector small and individual market insurance
offerings. To achieve dramatic expansion of health insurance,
however, ACA does more than construct a benign floor; it also
makes significant changes in the structure, processes, and
administration of insurance, and in so doing, markedly expands
the scope of federal oversight in an area traditionally left to the
states. Of particular note, the law expands the administrative
simplification regulations under the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, mandating new operating rules to
create uniformity in medical information reporting and electronic
transfer of data to health insurers-an unheralded, but critical
infrastructure reform. 25

time period required in the law. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Title VIII, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010). Title IX contains the revenue portions
of ACA, which include Medicare taxes on high-income earners, as well as
assessments and taxes on drug, medical device, and health insurance
companies, and special taxes on high-cost health insurance plans and tanning
beds. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Title IX, Pub. L. No. 111-148
(2010). Title X is largely a procedural title making changes and amendments
to the law, but is primarily noteworthy for its reauthorization of the Indian
Health Care Improvement Act. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Title X, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010).
24. See Jason Linkins, The Beginning of the End for the Public Option,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Nov.
29,
2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/29/the-beginning-of-theend n 303612.html (discussing the public option); see also Ben Smith, Obama
Rejects Single Payer, POLITICO (June 15, 2009), http://www.politico.com/
blogs/bensmith/0609/Obama-rejects single-payer.html (citing Obama's plan
for a middle ground between private and government funded care).
25. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Title I, Pub. L. No. 111148, § 1104 (2010); Affordable Care Act cuts red tape, saves $12 billion, U.S.
DEP'T
OF
HEALTH
&
HuM.
SERVICES
(June
30,
2011),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/06/20110630a.html.
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Shortly after the President signed ACA, the Obama
Administration set off a vigorous regulatory timeline, which
resulted in rapid implementation of key sections of the law. 26 From
the regulations on a tanning-bed tax, to more recent regulations
on accountable care organizations (ACO), health insurance plan
information requirements, and value-based purchasing, a new
landscape of rules has developed, which must be accommodated by
virtually all components of the health care sector. 27 This
regulatory activity-spearheaded by three agencies, the
Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and
Treasury-is unprecedented for its volume and complexities, as
regulators must meet ACA's new legislative directives that expand
federal programs in ways that both harmonize with and build off
existing statutes. In addition to the federal activity, states have
been extensively engaged in ACA-related health reform in both
their roles as regulator and regulatee. Many states are creating
health insurance exchanges, and virtually all are engaged in
insurance reforms, Medicaid analyses and revisions, and major
statutory compliance revisions. 28 But, however voluminous and
complex ACA regulatory design and compliance may be, such
processes are the stock and trade of modern governments; of all
the variables that will determine ACA's success or failure,
regulatory accommodation is one that can be addressed, not easily,
but nevertheless, within the parameters of established
administrative laws and related bureaucratic processes.
The question of whether ACA can successfully build a
national floor for health insurance goes well beyond concerns over
bureaucratic responses and capacities, and implicates greater
considerations about the federal role in shaping macro and micro
policies in the areas of health care delivery and insurance
generally. The law deals with many of the major variables, such as
cost, quality, and human resource development, which will
26. See Implementation Timeline, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION,
http://healthreform.kff.org/timeline.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) (outlining
the ACA timeline).
27. See Indoor Tanning Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 33,683 (June 15, 2010)
(establishing a tanning-bed tax); Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed.
Reg. 67, 802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (establishing the Medicare Shared Savings
Program for accountable care organizations); Summary of Benefits and
Coverage and Uniform Glossary, 77 Fed. Reg. 8668 (Feb. 14, 2012)
(summarizing benefits and coverage).
28. Rachel Morgan, The 2011 State Legislators' Check List for Health
Reform Implementation, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
2011),
(February
See
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/healthlStateLegislatorsCheckdec20.pdf.
Michael Cooper, Many Governors Are Still Unsure About Medicaid Expansion,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14,2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/us/governorsface-hard-choices-over-medicaidexpansion.html?_r=1&ref=nationalgovernorsassociation.
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influence the course of health reform. In building its web of
coverage, ACA lays the foundation for key system redesigns
through a variety of initiatives to promote innovation in the
delivery of care and the practice of medicine. Initiatives such as
the Medicare Shared Savings Program for physicians in ACOs and
the expansion of value-based purchasing for hospitals are directed
to long-term systemic changes, which encapsulate the core feature
of so much of government health policy, namely improving quality
through leverage of reimbursement systems. 29 Although each of
these areas presents massive and complex challenges, these
challenges remain within the purview and influence of government
health regulators and Congress.
Other, larger variables affecting ACA, such as economics,
federal budget realities, politics, and the march of science and
technology, extend beyond the capacity of any law; they are wild
cards that may skew the plans of health reformers and play havoc
with the future prospects of government health policy. From its
inception to the present, ACA has been molded and implemented
in the cross currents of these variables. Although fiscal
externalities in health policy are hard to gauge, they nevertheless
can be anticipated to some extent and, as is evident in ACA's
history, have been and will continue to be fundamental
considerations in legislative deliberations. What is curious about
ACA, however, is that the one externality that has somewhat
blindsided the process of reform has been the law itself. Legal
challenges to legislation of every sort are not unusual, and it is
certainly evident in review of ACA that there was a strong
awareness that the individual mandate could become a point of
contention. 30 There is not, however, comparable evidence that a
challenge concerning the law's Medicaid expansion was a serious
threat to legislative implementation. On the implementation side,
there are many challenging issues surrounding the ACA Medicaid
expansion, but the constitutionality of this expansion was an
unpredictable variable of health reform that only the most ardent
of state rights' advocates would have predicted, and arguably
added to state challenges primarily for the sake of standing.

29. Paul B. Ginsburg & Chapin White, Health Care's Role in Deficit
Reduction-GuidingPrinciples,366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1559, 1559-61 (2011).
30. See Jennifer Staman & Cynthia Brougher, Requiring Individuals to
Obtain Health Insurance:A ConstitutionalAnalysis, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
(July
24,
2009),
http://www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/departments/healthpolicy/healthreform/CRS%20
ReportConstitutionality.pdf; David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Mandatory
Insurance is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18,
2009),
http://online.wsj.comlarticle/
SB10001424052970204518504574416623109362480.html.

610

III.

The John Marshall Law Review

[45:601

MEDICAID: OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONTEXT OF FEDERALISM

Medicaid grew out of the Johnson Administration's War on
Poverty and reflects a fundamental concern about the health and
wellbeing of the disadvantaged.31 It is rooted in the Social Security
Act and designed to follow the format of other welfare programs.
That is, it is voluntary, jointly administered by the states and
federal government, financed out of matching general revenue
funds, and based on an eligibility means test. 32 The core of
Medicaid was to provide medical assistance to two primary
populations: families enrolled in the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program and individuals participating in the
federally assisted cash welfare program for the blind, aged, and
disabled. For state governments, the cooperative federalism
approach underlying Medicaid has created a challenging balance
of flexibility and control. On one hand, the Medicaid statute
conditions the receipt of federal matching funds on federal
approval of a state operating plan, as well as subsequent
amendments to such a plan, which must meet requirements for
program structure, operations, and benefits. 33 But, on the other
hand, the statute grants states flexibility to individually tailor
their Medicaid programs through the addition of optional benefits,
resulting in significant variations in plans across the country,
reflected in eligibility, the scope and nature of services, and
provider reimbursement rates.
Although the history of Medicaid does not parallel the
constant reinvention of Medicare, it is nevertheless characterized
by ongoing and regular changes in structure and benefits. Without
accounting for the ACA expansion, Medicaid is already the
nation's largest public health insurer, enrolling a population
exceeding fifty-five million, with a combined federal-state cost of

31. Frank Fossett & Frank J. Thompson, Administrative Responsiveness to
the Disadvantaged: The Case of Children's Health Insurance, 16 J. PUB.
at
available
(2006),
370
THEORY
&
RES.
ADMIN.
2005-09-15http://www.rockinst.org/pdflhealth-care/
administrative responsiveness to-the disadvantaged.thecaseof
children's health insurance.pdf.
32. Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program:
A Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 856-57 (1990). See generally
John K. Iglehart, Expanding Eligibility, Cuttings Costs-A Medicaid Update,
366 N. ENG. J. MED. 105, 105-07 (2012); Report to the Congress on Medicaid
and CHIP, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM'N 26-45, (2011),
http:(lhealthreformgps.org/wpat
available
content/uploads/MACPAC_March201 1_web.pdf.
33. 42 U.S.C.S. 1396(a) (2012); Report to the Congress on Medicaid and
CHIP, supra note 32. See generally Policy Basics: Introduction to Medicaid,
CTR.
ON
BUDGET
&
POLICY
PRIORITIES
(Dec.
17,
2008),
(providing a basic
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa-view&id=2223
introduction to the Medicaid program).
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$400 billion. 34 In its 2011 report, the Medicaid and CHIP Payment
and Access Commission, a body that advises Congress on Medicaid
policy, detailed twenty-five changes in the federal Medicaid law in
coverage and eligibility since its passage in 1965. These changes
include the 1972 coverage extension of individuals covered under
the then-new Supplement Security Income (SSI) program, and
new mandates and optional categories for pregnant women and
children based on higher FPL guidelines in the 1980s. 35 More
recent major changes have occurred as a result of new eligibility
guidelines in federal welfare reform legislation: Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families, and the Children's Health
Insurance Program (CHIP) in 1997 and its 2009 reauthorization.36
Not only have Medicaid benefits been markedly expanded over
time, but noticeable changes in the nature and structure of care
have occurred, and continue to occur. These changes emphasize
shifting enrollees from fee-for-service settings to managed care
and primary care case management, and from long-term care
facilities
to
community-based
non-institutional
care
arrangements.3 7 The current picture of the program, at best, is a
mixed one, as the fifty-six different plans under the Medicaid
umbrella are essential to provide safety-net services to a growing
number and type of enrollees, yet they are plagued with problems
of cost and quality, manifest in low provider payment and in
states' ongoing struggles to expand long-term care needs. 38 The
troubled yin and yang of federal Medicaid financing, underpinned
by the open nature of the federal medical assistance program
(FMAP)-the so-called matching rate-has created a dizzying
array of programmatic changes, and a persistent dissonance
between expansion of efforts and control of expenditures occurring
in the face of unemployment, recession, and the complexities of
cost containment driven by swelling numbers of the aged and
disabled.39
ACA represents the largest expansion of Medicaid since its
inception in 1965 and accounts for forty-five percent of the overall

34. Report to the Congress on Medicaid and CHIP,supra note 32.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 117-122.
37. Iglehart, supra note 32.
38. Report to the Congress on Medicaid and CHIP, supra note 32, at 13;
Iglehart, supra note 32.
39. Report to the Congress on Medicaid and CHIP,supra note 32; see also
Iglehart, supra note 32 (discussing Medicaid costs and recent Supreme Court
rulings); see also Vernon K. Smith et al., Moving Ahead Amid Fiscal
Challenges: A Look at Medicaid Spending, Coverage and Policy Trends,
KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED (2011), http://www.kff.org/

medicaid/upload/8248.pdf (noting Medicaid costs and the impact of the
recession on state funding).
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costs of health reform. 40 The law expands Medicaid coverage in
2014 by creating a new eligibility category for nearly all
individuals under age sixty-five and, with a special deduction
equal to five percent of the FPL, in essence raises eligibility levels
to 138 percent of the FPL.41 New categories of eligible enrollees
will qualify for the program based on a calculation of an
individual's modified adjusted gross income removed from
traditional asset or resource tests.42 The expansion, while
primarily directed to adults without dependent children, will also
impact poor parents, as well as children with family incomes up to
133 percent of the FPL.43 States do not need to provide newlyenrolled adults standard comprehensive Medicaid benefits, but
rather must offer essential health benefits, which include ten core
features, such as hospitalization, prescription drugs, and
preventive services, as well as benchmarks for plans to guarantee
uniformity of offerings for new enrollees. Over the next ten years,
ninety-three percent of the costs for the ACA Medicaid expansion
will be borne by the federal government, with varying state FMAP
payments.44 Then, in 2020, the federal share will drop to ninety
percent for all Medicaid programs.45 Until health exchanges begin
operation in 2014, states must follow maintenance-of-effort
standards, which prevent them from altering program eligibility
criteria that were in place at the time of ACA's passage. 46 Other
key ACA Medicaid changes include increasing rebates for
enrollment via statestreamlining
prescription drugs,
administered websites, and mandating states to increase outreach
to, and enrollment of, underserved and vulnerable populations. 47
40. Landers & Leeman, supra note 11, at 145.
41. Pam Silberman, Eligibility and Enrollment: Medicaid Workgroup, N.C.
http://www.nciom.org/wp2011),
13,
(Apr.
OF
MED.
INST.
content/uploads/2010/12/eligibility-enrollment.pdf.
42. Id.; see also Carrie Au-Yeung and John Czajka, Modified Adjusted
Gross Income: Implications for Medicaid Eligibility Systems under the ACA,
STATE
HEALTH
ACCESS
DATA
ASSISTANCE
CTR.
(July 2011),
http://www.shadac.org/files/shadac/
publications/ACA%20NoteMAGIFMAP.pdf.
43. Landers and Leeman, supra note 11.
44. January Angeles & Matt Broaddus, Federal Government Will Pick Up
Nearly All Costs of Health Reform's Medicaid Expansion, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL'Y
PRIORITIES
(Mar.
28,
2012),
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa-view&id=3161.
45. Id.
46. Maintenance of Effort Requirements Under Health Reform, FAMILIES
http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/health2010),
USA
(Mar.
reform/maintenance-of-effort.pdf.
47. See S. FIN. COMM. & H. ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM., 112TH CONG.,
MEDICAID EXPANSION IN THE NEW HEALTH LAW: COSTS TO THE STATES (2011),
at
available
http://energycommerce.house.gov/media/file/PDFs/03011 1MedicaidReport.pdf;
Angeles and Broaddus; Silberman, supra note 41.
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Even with massive amounts of new federal money, state
governments are concerned about potential expansion in
administrative costs, the financial implications of increases in
enrollment from already qualified populations, and their overall
ability to comply with maintenance-of-effort requirements in the
face of a deep economic downturn. 48 State Medicaid programs were
able to sustain their efforts through the worst part of the recession
with the help of special stimulus funding, but as of 2011 that
funding expired.49 The Congressional Budget Office projects that
an additional 25.6 million people will enroll in Medicaid in the
next decade, increasing state administrative costs by $12 billion,
and that the new eligibility groups will cost the states a total of
$118 billion through 2023.50 The pressures of expansion will be
compounded by the fact that Medicaid financing will remain a
perennial target for cost cutting at the federal level in the face of
the seemingly intractable budget deficit and the burgeoning
federal debt. In his 2013 federal budget proposal, President
Obama calls for fifty-one billion dollars in Medicaid cuts over the
next ten years, which conceivably could improve the overall
functioning of the program, but would likely exact a price on state
finances.51 Although Washington is holding the line on ensuring
states' compliance with current Medicaid obligations, federal
policy in this area has reflected, and continues to reflect, an
awareness of the core role of states and a growing sensitivity to
the fragility of state finances. Of late, the posture of the federal
executive branch is one that, at least publically, has embraced
individual state approaches to Medicaid and, within the
boundaries of federal obligation, provides significant latitude to

48. S. FIN. COMM. & H. ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM., supra note 47.
49. Ron Shinkman, States Pockets Empty as Medicaid Stimulus Winds
Down,
FIERCE
HEALTH
FIN.,
(July
19,
2011),
http://www.fiercehealthfinance.com/story/medicaid-stimulus-winds-downstates-ask-now-what/2011-07-19.
50. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. TRUFFER ET AL., DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., 2010 ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OUTLOOK FOR
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and(2010),
MEDICAID
downloads/IMedicaidReport20l0.pdf
Systems/ResearchlActuarialStudies/
(outlining Medicaid trends, past and present, and discussing enrollment and
expenditures).
51. To save costs, the President proposes blending the Medicaid and
Children's Health Insurance Program match rates, reducing the number of
provider taxes for which states can draw down matching dollars, reducing the
disproportionate share funds for hospitals, and reducing fraud and abuse for
durable medical equipment. Debra Miller, The President's Health Budget:
Federal Savings May Translate to Increased State Expenditure, KNOWLEDGE
AM),
http://knowledgecenter.
11:10
2012,
(Feb.
14,
CENTER,
csg.org/drupal/content/presidentE2%80%99s-health-budget-federal-savingsmay-translate-increased-state-expenditures-0.
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state reform proposals. 52 The implications of National Federation
for Medicaid expansion only serve to exacerbate the federal need
to accommodate states, as the conditions of expansion must be
careful crafted with all fifty-six programs.
IV. COERCION: THE LEGAL CLAIM
Despite the federal government's attempts to conciliate the
states, a number of state governments concluded that ACA
stretched the program beyond the parameters of cooperative
federalism. To these states, the costs and administrative burdens
they would have to bear under the law transformed Medicaid into
a far different arrangement from what they agreed to when they
joined the program post-1965, constituting a type of breach of
contract. These states claimed to effectively have no choice to take
on these new responsibilities, moreover, because to decline them
would trigger withdrawal of all federal Medicaid matching fundsa circumstance too daunting for any state to consider, particularly
in the current economy. Thus, in either scenario, the states were
allegedly forced to bankrupt their treasuries. Faced with such
prospects, these states turned to federal court for redress. In that
forum, they alleged that the federal government exploited its taxand-spend power to "coerce" them to comply with an overreaching
federal dictate, thereby violating the Constitution's structural
safeguards to preserve a federalist system of governance-an
argument surprisingly accepted by the Supreme Court majority in
53
National Federation.
The high stakes of this claim were evident in the states'
carefully tailored, albeit politically charged, litigation strategy.
Florida, a large-population political bellwether that has confronted
federal oversight of its Medicaid program in other contexts, 54 led
52. Sebelius Outlines State Flexibility and Federal Support Available for
Medicaid, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/ press/2011pres/01/20110203c.html.
53. National Federation,No.11-393, slip. op at 45-57.
54. As Florida litigated its challenge to ACA in court, the state in late 2011
asked the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to waive certain
statutory requirements under the federal Medicaid law. Most ambitiously, the
state proposed to shift nearly all its three million Medicaid beneficiaries onto
privately-managed care plans. See Letter from Roberta K. Bradford, Deputy
Sec'y for Medicaid, Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., to Richard Jensen,
Dir., Div. of State Demonstrations & Waivers, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
http://ahca.myflorida.com/
available at
2011),
1,
(Aug.
Servs.
Medicaid/statewide-mc/fsdocs/Amendment_1_11 15MedicaidReformWaiver_08
012011.pdf (outlining the proposed shift from Medicaid to private managed
cared plans). Additionally, the state proposed to require beneficiaries to pay a
$10 monthly premium and a $100 copayment for nonemergency use of the
emergency room. See generally Letter from Roberta K. Bradford, Deputy Sec'y
for Medicaid, Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., to Richard Jensen, Dir.,
Div. of State Demonstrations & Waivers, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.
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the group of litigants. Together with thirteen other states-a
number that grew to twenty-six state governors and attorneys
general after the 2010 midterm election-then Florida Attorney
General Bill McCollum filed suit in federal court only minutes
after President Obama signed the law in 2010.55 Any one of the
various states could have been the setting for the challenge, but
media reports speculated that the state officials opted for Florida
to ensure appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, which has garnered Supreme Court review (and reversal)
in recent years in cases holding that Congress unconstitutionally
exerted its Commerce Clause power.56 To this supposed end,
http://ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/
2011),
1,
(Aug.
statewide mc/fsdocs/Amendment_2_1115_MedicaidReformWaiver0801201
l.pdf; Letter from Roberta K. Bradford, Deputy Sec'y for Medicaid, Fla.
Agency for Health Care Admin., to Richard Jensen, Dir., Div. of State
Demonstrations & Waivers, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Aug. 1,
http://ahea.myflorida.com/Medicaid/
2011),
statewide_mc/fsdocs/Amendment_3_1115_MedicaidReformWaiver0801201
1.pdf. (explaining the increased costs for beneficiaries). CMS denied the latter
two proposals, citing in part ACA's maintenance-of-effort requirements as
barring the monthly premium. See Letter from Victoria Wachino, Dir., Div. of
State Demonstrations & Waivers, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid, to Justin M.
Senior, Deputy Sec'y for Medicaid, Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. (Feb.
http://ahca.myflorida
2012),
9,
.com/medicaid/statewidemc/fsdocs/Final-signed_ FL -amend_02-09-12.pdf
(deciding against adopting a proposal that would include monthly premiums).
As of this writing, CMS has yet to rule on the managed-care proposal, which
some analysts suggest could restrict beneficiaries' access to care and yield
minimal, if any, savings. See Christine Vestal, Studies Point to Flaws in
Florida's Medicaid Managed Care, STATELINE (Dec. 14, 2011),
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=619038. Though different
in form, these proposals substantively derive from the same source as
Florida's coercion claim: a desire to release the state from what it perceives to
be a tremendous financial burden.
55. Complaint, Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT), 2010
WL 1038209 [hereinafter Florida]. Virginia filed its own federal lawsuit
challenging ACA on the day that the President signed the law. Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010) (No. 3:10CV188-HEH), 2010 WL 3875236
[hereinafter Virginia]. Several months later, Oklahoma filed a similar lawsuit.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v.
Sebelius, No. 6:11-CV-30-RAW (E.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2011) [hereinafter
Oklahoma]. Unlike the Florida lawsuit, both the Virginia and Oklahoma
lawsuits challenge only the individual mandate. See generally Virginia, supra,
16-21. All the lawsuits, however, seek to
at f 17-20; Oklahoma, supra, at
invalidate ACA in full on the ground that the allegedly unconstitutional
mandate is not severable from the legislation. Notwithstanding these efforts,
other states have proffered their support for the law in amici briefs in the
courts. See, e.g., Brief of the States of Oregon et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents, Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604
(2012) (No. 11-400), 2012 WL 588460 (addressing the Medicaid challenge).
56. Kevin Sack, Florida Suit Poses a Challenge to Health Care Law, N.Y.

616

The John Marshall Law Review

[45:601

McCollum elected against suing in Tallahassee, the location of the
attorney general's office; instead, he sued more than 200 miles
away in Pensacola, promising that the presiding judge at the small
court there would be a Republican appointee.57 On the merits, the
states attacked the constitutionality of ACA's Medicaid expansion
and also the individual mandate,5 8 which clashed with laws that
some of the states passed to relinquish their citizens' obligation to
acquire health insurance under ACA.69 Later, the states amended
their complaint to include two individuals and a trade
association,6 0 who seemed better able to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements to challenge the mandate. Thus amended, the suit
presented a quantity and diversity of plaintiffs and claims unseen
in the multiple other ACA lawsuits then emerging, making it the
most formidable vehicle to test the legislation before the Supreme
Court.
Nevertheless, the strategic planning did not remove the legal
obstacles to succeeding on the coercion claim in the lower courts.
The claim traces to a single sentence from South Dakota v. Dole,61
a 1987 case in which the Supreme Court speculated that "in some
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might
be so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into
compulsion."' 62 In making this observation, the Court relied on
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, a 1937 case in which the Court
2010),
10,
(May
TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/health/policy/ll1awsuit.html?
pagewanted=1&emc=eta.
57. Id.; Tom McLaughlin, Why Challenge Health Care Reform in
Pensacola?,
Nw.
FLA.
DAILY
NEWS
(Mar.
24,
2010),
http://www.nwfdailynews.cominews/pensacola-27292-mccollum-health.html.
58. Florida, supra note 55, at 1 54-67.
59. See generally Richard Cauchi, State Legislation and Actions
Challenging Certain Health Reforms, 2011-2012, NAT'L CONF. OF ST.
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-laws-andLEGISLATURES,
actions-challenging-aca.aspx (last updated Apr. 5, 2012) (discussing state
proposals). Framing the individual mandate as an affront to federalism, both
Virginia and Oklahoma premise their challenges on the mandate's conflict
with laws in these states exempting their citizens from any obligation to
procure health insurance. In the Virginia case, however, the Fourth Circuit
held that this conflict failed to impose a sufficient injury on the state so as to
provide it with Article III standing to challenge the federal requirement.
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 270-72 (4th Cir. 2011),
petition for cert. filed, No. 11-420 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011); cf. Florida ex rel. Att'y
Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Sers., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243-44 (11th
Cir. 2011) (declining to determine whether the state plaintiffs in the Florida
lawsuit had standing to challenge the individual mandate because private
plaintiffs in the case had standing to challenge the provision).
26-28, Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d
60. Amended Complaint at
1256 (No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT).
61. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
62. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937)).
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"assume[d] that [the] concept [of coercion] can ever be applied with
fitness to the relations between state and nation." 63 Just as the
Court concluded in Steward Machine Co. that Congress did not use
a tax credit for employers to coercively induce the states to
establish unemployment compensation schemes, the Court
concluded in Dole that Congress did not use highway
appropriations to coercively induce the states to raise their alcohol
drinking age to twenty-one. 64 Since Dole, moreover, no court has
found coercive use of Congress's tax-and-spend authority. Almost
all the courts that have considered the question indeed have held
that Dole's "coercion test" is not much of a test at all, reasoning
that it implicates questions of economics, policy, and politics far
beyond the judiciary's competence to answer.65 Some of these cases
specifically involved federal reforms of Medicaid. In California v.
United States,6 6 for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the federal government's conditioning Medicaid funds on
California's agreeing to provide emergency medical services to
undocumented immigrants presented the State with "hard
political choices," not coercion. 67
The failure of the states in Floridav. Department of Health &
Human Services68 to successfully allege coercion before the single
federal court to invalidate all of ACA as tainted by the
unconstitutionality of the individual mandate attests to the states'
difficult legal position. After allowing their coercion claim to
survive a motion to dismiss,6 9 the district court held on motions for
summary judgment that it was "simply impossible to resolve this
factual dispute now as both sides' financial data are based on
economic assumptions, estimates, and projections many years
out."70 Ultimately, however, because the court ruled that the
individual mandate was unconstitutional and not severable from
ACA, thus necessitating invalidation of all the legislation,7 1 the
63. Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590.
64. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
65. See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (10th Cir.
2000) ("[T]he cursory statements in Steward Machine and Dole mark the
extent of the Supreme Court's discussion of a coercion theory. The Court has
never employed the theory to invalidate a funding condition, and federal
courts have been similarly reluctant to use it.") (footnote omitted)); Nevada v.
Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989) (describing the coercion theory as
"highly suspect as a method for resolving disputes between federal and state
governments").
66. California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 1997).
67. Id. at 1092 (quoting Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448).
68. Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716
F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
69. Id. at 1156-60.
70. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.
Supp. 2d 1256, 1267 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
71. Id. at 1299-1305; cf. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
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states prevailed, at least as a practical matter, on their coercion
claim.
The reprieve, however, was short lived. On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court on the coercion claim
and reversed on the severability of the individual mandate,
thereby leaving the Medicaid expansion intact. 72 To this end, the
court chastised its sister circuits for rejecting Dole's coercion test,
deeming it "an amorphous . . [doctrine], honest in theory but
complicated in application." 73 Still, the court concluded the
Medicaid expansion was not unduly coercive. 74 The court cited four
reasons for support: (1) Congress gave Medicaid-participating
states statutory notice that it reserved the right to change the
program, and over the years it exercised that right, requiring
participant states to comply with the changes or lose all or part of
their funding; (2) the federal government will bear nearly all of the
costs of the expansion; (3) because the expansion will not go into
effect until 2014, the states will have had nearly four years of
notice from the President signing ACA to decide whether to
continue to participate; and (4) the states have independent taxing
and spending powers, which they could use to create and fund
their own programs if they did not like Congress's conditions on
Medicaid.75 In addition, the court disputed the states' contention
that their failure to participate in the expansion would trigger loss
of all their federal Medicaid funding because federal law provides
DHHS with discretion over the amount of funding to withhold
from a noncompliant state.76 Therefore, the court summarized,
"the Medicaid-participating states have a real choice-not just in
theory but in fact-to participate in the Act's Medicaid
expansion."77
Thus unanimously rejected by both the district court and
Eleventh Circuit, the states' coercion claim seemed unlikely to
attract the Supreme Court's attention. Yet, in one of the most
surprising developments in the ACA litigation, the Court granted

Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1317-20 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (staying the
court's declaratory order on the constitutionality of ACA pending appeal).
72. Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648
F.3d 1235, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011).
73. Id. at 1266.
74. Id. at 1262.
75. Id. at 1267-68.
76. Id. at 1268 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006)).
77. Id. Justice Ginsburg in her dissent in NationalFederationadopts many
of the arguments noted in the lower courts, seeing the ACA as an extension of
Medicaid paid for by the federal government, as well as an extension that does
not alter the considerable autonomy states enjoy in running their respective
programs. National Federation, No.11-393, slip. op at 45-57 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting in part).
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certiorari on the issue.78 Why exactly is unclear, compared with
the Court's much-expected decision to take on the question of the
individual mandate's constitutionality, which contrastingly
spurred disagreement on substantive and procedural grounds
among the courts.7 9 Whatever the reason, the states' task of
convincing the Court to rule favorably for them on their coercion
Clause
its
Commerce
Unlike
steep.80
claim
appeared
jurisprudence, the Court has not significantly developed the theory
of coercive federal spending since Dole, thus putting the impetus
on the Court to craft and apply a constitutional principle that
strikes at the heart of federalism. As commentator Brad Joondeph
opines, moreover, the Court's responsibility to exercise
"superintendence and rationalization of constitutional doctrine . . .
generally leads the justices to eschew arguments or legal theories
that seriously disrupt or complicate judge-made constitutional
law."81 Consequently, it seemed that however sympathetic the
Court might have been to the states' position, the Court would
hesitate to invalidate the ACA Medicaid expansion, lest it render
"a holding [that] would be far-reaching and doctrinally
destabilizing."82
The Court, however, once again proved that how it rules on
the law is not based on the weight of speculation but rather its
independent reading of the law. In National Federation,the Court
found limits on congressional spending power rooted in the thin
line of jurisprudence spawned by Stewart Machine.8 3 The Court
recognized the legitimacy of Congress's conditioning federal funds
to the states-a typical practice-but found merit in the argument
that there is a limitation on such power. The majority, quoting

78. Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011); N.C.
Aizenman, Supreme Court's Planned Review of Health-Care Law Shocks
Medicaid
Advocates,
WASH.
POST,
Nov.
16,
2011,
health-science/court-review-ofhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
medicaid-expansion-could-have-massive-consequences/
2011/11/15/gIQAILwkSN-story.html.
79. Compare Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(holding the individual mandate constitutional), and Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2011) (same), with Florida ex rel. Att'y
Gen., 648 F.3d at 1328 (holding the individual mandate unconstitutional), and
Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *14 (4th
Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act precludes a preenforcement challenge to the individual mandate).
80. See Laura Hermer, The States' Challenge to the Affordable Care Act's
Medicaid Expansion, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 5 (2011) (noting every federal
appellate court has rejected a claim of coercion by the states).
81. Bradley W. Joondeph, Federalism and Health Care Reform:
Understandingthe States' Challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, 41 PUBLIUS 447, 449 (2011).
82. Id.
83. National Federation,No.11-393, slip. op at 49.
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from Stewart Machine, concluded that the Medicaid expansion in
ACA reconfigured the terms of the federal-state agreement, and
was such a fundamental change as to constitute a breach of
contract, and a gross infringement on state sovereignty. Chief
Justice Roberts's opinion was colored by two realities: the
provision of one hundred percent federal matching funds for the
ACA Medicaid expansion and the Medicaid law's grant of
authority to the Secretary of DHHS to withdraw all Medicaid
funds for the failure of a state to expand its Medicaid program
under the terms of ACA. Roberts characterized these elementsfederal funding and the mounding potential loss of all Medicaidas coercion, a type of "economic dragooning" that leaves the states
with no choice but to accept the ACA expansion. 84 Secondly, the
Court concluded that the ACA Medicaid expansion was so
extensive as not to go beyond prior changes of degree and
constitute a change in kind, reaching beyond the program's role of
treating the neediest to establishing Medicaid as a building block
of a national health insurance plan. The Court ruled that it is
unconstitutionally coercive for the Secretary of DHHS to use her
discretion to withhold all Medicaid funds for a state's refusal to
expand its Medicaid program under the terms of the ACA.8 5 The
Court held that the coercive nature of the ACA Medicaid
expansion could be mitigated by invoking the severability clause of
the Medicaid law, allowing only the mandatory expansion to be
struck and preserving the ACA Medicaid expansion as a matter of
state discretion.8 6
V. FEDERALISM AND BEYOND

In a sense, the dispute over Medicaid and federalism raised in
National Federation is tangential to governance in that it does
little or nothing to address the operational realities that the two
levels of government, federal and state, face namely meeting the
complex needs of current enrollees and more broadly the health
needs of growing poor uninsured populations. This is not to
suggest that the ruling in National Federation concerning the
states' role in ACA's Medicaid expansion is not programmatically

84. Id. at 45-59.
85. Id. at 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396(c), the Secretary of DHHS has the
power to cut off all Medicaid funding for the failure of a state to amend its
Medicaid plan to include the ACA program expansion.
86. Id. The Court used 42 U.S.C. § 1303 of the Medicaid law, a severability
provision to allow, the unconstitutional extension of § 1396(c) to be struck
without striking § 1396(c)'s application to existing Medicaid programs. The
Court reading of ACA in the Medicaid context was such that a state's refusal
to expand its Medicaid programs under the health reform bill put a state in
the position of losing all its federal Medicaid funding. This finding was
characterized by Chief Justice Roberts as "a gun to the head". Id. at 51.
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significant. Certainly, it is helpful to have a confirmation of the
need to preserve dual sovereignty via the coercion doctrine and
concepts of contract, but the Court refused to set boundaries for
federalism in a way that will clarify the legislative parameters of
Congress, or spark changes in federal-state governance.8 7 Medicaid
has existed for nearly fifty years, and the cries of states have
resonated throughout this period, well before ACA's expansion and
the current controversy.88 Although fundamental, it should
continue to be stressed, as the courts have noted over the years,8 9
that Medicaid is a voluntary program. Like other social securitybased programs, no state is forced to participate and accept federal
dollars; however, once a state does participate, it must comply
with federal law and face the reality of preemption.90 Undoubtedly
as demonstrated by National Federation,states have real, genuine
concerns that must be recognized in dealing with the Medicaid
expansion, but they are adept at navigating the regulatory and
political shoals of the program, and have simultaneously sought
increased funding while struggling to be free from Washington's
regulatory handcuffs.91 Although perhaps overly glib, it does not
seem unreasonable to characterize the overriding state position on
Medicaid as "give us the money and leave us alone," with the
federal corollary to state complaints being an exasperated "are you
serious?" 92
Prior to turning to considerations of federalism, four
observations emerge, which are external to constitutional law
considerations visited in National Federation, but central to
Medicaid's future. First, Medicaid as we know it cannot function
without involvement of both federal and state levels of

87.

Id. at 55.

88. See generally, JONATHAN ENGEL, POOR PEOPLE'S MEDICINE, MEDICAID
AND AMERICAN CHARITY CARE SINCE 1965 (2006); see also LAURA KATZ OLSEN,
THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID (2010) (discussing the political debates

surrounding Medicaid).
89. The point has been widely recognized in the federal courts that
Medicaid imposes obligations on the states, but is at its core a voluntary
program. For an example, see Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498,
503 (1990).
90. Bradley J. Sayles, Preemption or Bust: A Review of the Recent Trends in
Medicaid Preemption Cases, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 120, 137-38
(2010).
91. See, e.g., Creatinga Climate for Innovation, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
STATE
MEDICAID
DIRECTORS
(Nov.
9,
2011),
http://medicaiddirectors.org/node/192.
92. Eric Zimmerman, Pelosi to Reporter, 'Are You Serious?, THE HILL (Oct.
23,

2009, 2:14 PM),

http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/64547-

pelosi-to-reporter-are-you-serious (reporting U.S. House Speaker Nancy
Pelosi's three-word response to a question about whether there is sufficient
congressional power to enact the individual health insurance mandate).
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government. 93 States may be able to structure more narrowly
tailored programs, such as programs for the elderly and disabled,
but independent of federal dollars, they cannot afford the array of
services and beneficiaries of even the leanest of current Medicaid
programs, much less the ACA expansion. 94 In turn, however,
states are viewed as sovereigns or delegated units of government.
They play roles in Medicaid from eligibility determination to
licensure, to care for the aged and disabled, which is either simply
inefficient to federalize or-as seen with the demise of the
Community Living Assistance Services and Support Act, the longterm care provision of ACA-may be simply beyond the
capabilities of federal policymakers to address. Second, if Medicaid
is to become a solid base on which to rest a significant portion of
the nation's health care insurance, uniform standards for general
operations, IT, quality-of-care evaluation, and claims reporting,
among other measures, must be implemented for both program
integrity and cost containment. Uniformity, moreover, can best be
achieved on the national level. Third, although Medicaid has
emerged as the nation's largest health program, Medicare is the
engine of change in health policy and, despite its troubles, is the
stronger of the two giants. It may be more realistic to expand
elements of the Medicare program, in particular those concerning
individuals dually eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid, the
most costly population in public insurance.9 5 Fourth, in order to
achieve meaningful improvements in health delivery, flexibility
and power sharing will be critical to encourage innovation and find
anecdotal solutions that best fit local needs, as such cooperative
federalism becomes essential.
It is an open question whether the constitutional
machinations about federalism have any direct relation to broader
Medicaid health policy considerations. It does seem reasonable,
however, to argue that a reconceptualization of intergovernmental
health relations is a necessary step in making ACA and its

93. See Hermer, supra note 80, at 9 (stating federal government matches
state Medicaid funds by fifty percent or greater).
94. See id. (noting the federal Medicaid money is an enormous source of
funds for the states). For a more recent reaction of state concerns over the
potential economic issues raised by the Medicaid ACA expansion see Lloyd
Dunkelberger, Scott Says Florida Can't Afford to Expand Medicaid, HERALD
TRIBUNE (June 29, 2012), http://politics.heraldtribune.com/2012/06/29/scottsays-florida-cant-afford-to-expand-medicaid/.
95. Under section 2602 of ACA, there are several efforts directed toward
better harmonization of care for dual eligibles. See About the MedicareMedicaid CoordinationOffice, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare-Medicaid-Coordination/Medicare-andMedicaid-Coordination/Medicare-Medicaid-Coordination-Office/ (last updated
June 13, 2012, 10:27 AM) (listing eight goals of the Medicare-Medicaid
Coordination Office to simplify and improve care to duel-eligible individuals).
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progeny more viable. There are positive aspects that can be drawn
from the current constitutional probing of Medicaid and
federalism, particularly as National Federation has invigorated
the doctrine of state sovereignty in a way that promotes
cooperative federalism by strengthening the need for forging better
partnership models. Paradoxically, federalism is both abstract and
fundamental; in the annals of American law, it is anything but an
obscure vestige of civics and constitutional law, but is an area ripe
with case law and discourse in which notable trends can be
identified in how federal courts have viewed the roles of the two
arenas of government.9 6 Several key frequently intersecting
variables emerge in federalism, including the power of the three
branches of the federal government to exert control over states
generally, within which there are frequent questions about federal
law supremacy, the power of Congress to regulate via the General
Welfare and Commerce Clauses, and limitations on federal power
under the Fourteenth Amendment. On the state side, federalism
issues often involve questions about individual and collective state
sovereignty, immunity from lawsuits, and the role of the Tenth
Amendment in carving out a legal territory in which states can
govern.97 Constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky notes that it
has only been since the mid-1990s that the Supreme Court has
reconnected with an older, more conservative view of federalism,
which questions unfettered congressional regulation in the name
of interstate commerce and revisits the governance role of states
under the Tenth Amendment.9 8 Notable trends can be identified in
how federal courts have viewed the roles of the two arenas of
government: the notion of dual federalism, which serves to
demarcate the particular roles of the federal and state
governments; cooperative federalism, which is a type of
partnership or contract model; and formalism, a more recent shift
which refocuses on considerations of the propriety of spheres of
power. There is also the middle ground of federalism struck by the
Court in Bond v. United States, in which Justice Kennedy notes
that federalism is about more than state sovereignty because it
ultimately serves to protect the rights of citizens against
government through the duality of governance.9 9
As discussed, the states' Medicaid expansion challenge
framed ACA as an unconstitutional extension of congressional
spending power, a type of coercion that finds a home with a
formalistic approach to federalism. Clearly, the idea that
96. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4 (providing an overview of
federalism).
97. See generally id. at 1-14 (examining issues related to federalism from
the states' perspective).
98. Id.
99. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
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Washington has commandeered state treasuries and moved
Medicaid into the realm of an adhesion contract is hardly the stuff
of cooperative governance; rather, it reflects a type of legal turf
war that is very much about scopes of power, and political and
legal battles that have both vertical and horizontal dimensions.
Despite the seeming legal hurdles, the Court in National
Federationfound a violation of state rights in part resting on a
breach of contract emanating from cooperative federalism, but
National Federation is ultimately grounded in a finding of
unconstitutionality rooted in a formalistic view of scopes of power.
While the federalism-related portion of National Federation is
more definitive than the recent, prior ruling in Douglas v.

Independent Living Center of Southern California, it is far more
relevant from a doctrinal vantage point than from an applied
one.100 Arguably the Court's ruling may have significant
implications for the future of Medicaid and more immediately calls
into question the abilities of health reform to reach its goal of
covering the majority of poor, uninsured Americans. But the
success of future governmental health policy demands that federal
and state government continue to work collaboratively and new
template for this critical relationship lies beyond the scope of the
National Federationcase, or perhaps any Supreme Court opinion.
What is being posited here is that other areas of law, beyond
constitutional doctrine, will need to be invoked in new and creative
ways to solidify the foundations of cooperative federalism. 101
100. See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctrs. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1204
(2012) (examining a federalism issue recently brought before the court). The
question in this case concerned whether Medicaid providers and recipients
could rely on the Supremacy Clause to bring an argument under the federal
Medicaid law. Id. at 1207. The consolidated cases concerned state obligations
to have sufficient numbers of providers to meet the care and service
requirements of Medicaid in lieu of a ten percent across-the-board cut in
provider fees. Id. at 1209. It was the position of the providers and recipients
that the federal law preempted California from reducing payments to
providers, an argument accepted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at
1209-10. In a 5-4 decision, a majority of the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth
Circuit opinion and remanded the case for further proceedings due to the fact
that CMS approved the California Medicaid statutes during the proceedings.
Id. at 1211. The Court remand raised the question of whether the dispute
should be handled under the Administrative Procedures Act. The majority
opinion in Independent Living Centers does offer private parties aggrieved by
arbitrary cuts in spending some opportunity for airing their claims through
administrative processes, thus finding a type of middle ground. Id. at 1210.
The minority opinion in Douglas simply rejected the idea that private parties
have a right to privately enforce the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 1211 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
101. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4. Chemerinsky argues that federalism
needs to be reconstituted, not as a doctrine of limitation, but rather as a
functional analysis of the authority needed by respective levels of government
to respond to social needs. Id. Chemerinsky argues for an expansive
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It is far easier to make an argument that federalism should
be reconfigured to achieve a more optimal balance between the
federal and state governments in health care than to actually
devise a working model to achieve these ends. Ideally, it would
have been helpful for the Court to craft a more definitive litmus
test for federalism based on an analysis of the propriety of
Congress's actions under the General Welfare Clause. The
federalism test under Dole, adopted in National Federation, is
largely generic, requiring that the spending in question is for the
general welfare; that the respective spending conditions are clear;
that the conditions relate to the federal interest in projects of
national scale; that the conditions themselves are constitutional;
and, most importantly, that the spending does not have a coercive
effect in forcing a state to accept federal funds. 102 National
Federation did not expand the conditions noted in Dole, but only
serves to affirm the viability of the coercion doctrine. Ideally a
reconstituted test ought to include considerations of financial
viability, programmatic efficiency, mutuality, and transparencyall elements that normally fall outside the landscape of
constitutional law and that are more typically visited in legislative
and executive circles. The biggest leap on this list is economic
consideration, but for purposes of maintaining relevancy in
adjudicating governance issues, fiscal concerns so central to a
program like Medicaid need to be directly addressed.
Expecting the Court to reconfigure federalism in a way that
strikes a new, more secure balance between the states and federal

government is a noble hope, but such a reconfiguration may take
years to play out. In the interim, two possible avenues-neither of
which is new, but both of which have languished on the back
burners of jurisprudence-could be pursued to enhance
intergovernmental relations on a practical level. The first is
administrative law reform, with a particular emphasis on
collaborative rulemaking. The second is a contract-based approach
to Medicaid, which rests on the use of interstate compacts as
specified in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution.
Administrative agencies are far more engaged in the daily
operations of Medicaid than either the judicial or the legislative
branch, so they are a logical focal point on which to leverage key
changes in federalism on an applied level. Under the wellestablished rule of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

interpretation of congressional power, a more liberal access to courts,
increased restriction of federal preemption, a rejection of ill-defined state
sovereignty and the use of the Tenth Amendment to support constitutional
claims. Id. The Court's position on federalism in Bond v. United States is
strong affirmation of the doctrine but adds little in the way of practical
direction.
102. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08, 211 (1987).
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Defense Council, Inc.,103 federal agencies have wide discretion,
bound typically by the restraints of procedural due process and
separation of powers, which have clear federalism implications.1 04
Legal scholar Gillian Metzger advocates for expanding the
boundaries of federalism and administrative law beyond matters
of preemption and regulatory procedure, to judicial review of
whether an agency "overstepped its boundaries ... by exercising
broader authority than Congress delegated, violating statutory
requirements, ignoring procedural mandates, or failing to
adequately justify its decisions." 05 Metzger identifies two models
for protecting federalism within the rubric of administrative law,
which could be applied generally to Medicaid. One model builds on
traditional administrative law principles with a heighted
sensitivity to state concerns. The other model expands judicial
deference to states, providing a distinct and enhanced protection to
state interests beyond the current administrative law framework.
A greater recognition of state interests via administrative law
could be advanced procedurally by congressional and
administrative policies that develop more participatory
mechanisms for states to be involved in collaborative rulemaking
and policymaking in programs such as Medicaid, triggered by
significant shared financing requirements. Of course, the issue is
not just a matter of deciphering processes that agencies could use
to better recognize state interests, but it is also a matter of
strengthening administrative law to adequately safeguard against
agency failings.
A more immediate source of guidance to buttress state
interests in cooperative federalism can be drawn from Executive
Order (EO) 13,132 and subsequent developments related to the
order. 0 6 President Clinton issued the order in 1999, amending
President Reagan's EO 12,612. EO 13,132 requires executive
branch agencies, and urges independent agencies, to respect
principles of federalism.107 To this end, the Clinton order, which is
still in force today, requires agencies to have an accountable
process to ensure meaningful and timely input by state and local
officials in the development of regulatory policies that have
federalism implications. 108 The order also requires notice and an
opportunity for state and local governments to participate in

103. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984).
104. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57
DUKE L.J. 2023, 2026 (2008).
105. Id. at 2054.
106. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (1999).
107. Id.
108. Id.; Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987) (President
Reagan's executive order).
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related proceedings in the event an agency action may result in
preemption of a state law through rulemaking or adjudication, in
which case the agency must provide a federalism impact
statement.10 9 To implement EO 13,132, the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and
Budget developed procedural guidelines for agencies to follow in
meeting the dictates of the order, which include having a
designated federalism official within an agency. 110 In 2009,
President Obama articulated a policy on preemption that
reinforced EO 13,132, requiring agencies to include preemption
policies within codified regulation.'1 1 EO 13,132 thus provides an
interesting avenue to recognize state interests and add a balance
in a more practical and immediate way than may happen via the
evolution of the Spending Clause doctrine in the courts. The
reality, however, is that this executive mandate must be
recognized by the courts and must additionally be consistently
followed by federal agencies. But as legal scholar Catherine
Sharkey and a subsequent study by the U.S. Administrative
Conference point out, the track record of federal agencies'
compliance is inconsistent and difficult to determine to date,
cutting across administrations and political parties.112
109. Adoption of Recommendation 76 Fed. Reg. 81 (Jan. 3, 2011).
110. Memorandum from Jacob J. Lew, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget, to
the Heads of Exec. Dept's. & Agencies, & Indep. Regulatory Agencies,
Guidance for implementing E.O. 13132, "Federalism" (Oct. 28,1999), available
at http://www.white house.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/m00-02.pdf.
111. Memorandum from Barack Obama, President, to the Heads of Exec.
at
available
2009),
20,
(May
Agencies
&
Dep'ts
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-05-22/pdf/E9-12250.pdf#page=l.
112. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: 'AgencyForcing"Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125 (2009) (explaining that federal agencies
need to abide by executive mandates to ensure activity and federal
compliance); see also Adoption of Recommendation, 76 Fed. Reg. 81 (Admin.
Conference of the U.S. Jan. 3, 2011); Am. Bar Ass'n H.D. Res. 117 (2010),
http://www.abanow.org/2010/07/am.2010-117 (urging Congress to clearly
address preemption issues when it enacts legislation). The U.S.
Administrative Conference has recommended that preemption analyses
required by EO 13,132 be reinvigorated through the adoption of ten
recommendations that are classified in three primary categories: (1) internal
procedures for compliance with the preemption provisions of EO 13,132; (2)
updated policies to ensure timely consultation with state and local interests
concerning preemption; and (3) actions by the Office of Management and
Budget and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to
improve the process. Adoption of Recommendation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 83. OIRA
recently issued a memorandum calling for early engagement with state, local,
and tribal agencies to identify opportunities for harmonized regulatory
development. Memorandum from Cass Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Info. &
RegulatoryAffairs, to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies, Cumulative Effects
at
available
20,2012),
(Mar.
Regulations
of
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/cumulativeeffects-guidance.pdf.
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In reference to Medicaid programs, a movement to shift
federalism to the more practical realms of agency policy
development and rulemaking would be helpful in mitigating the
detrimental effects of federal law that sharply alter the course of
the program in ways that unreasonably strain state capacities. A
preemption issue concerning California's cutting of provider fees in
apparent conflict with the Medicaid statute recently confronted
the Supreme Court in Douglas v. Independent Living Center of
Southern California.Such preemption matters are deeply rooted
in the jurisprudence of this program, and certainly collaborative
bureaucracy along the lines of EO 13,132 may mitigate future
disputes. In order for intergovernmental cooperation to develop in
a more meaningful way, two additional requirements should be
considered. First, the process of assessment in a program such as
Medicaid should not be limited to determination of federal actors
alone; state regulators also must make good-faith efforts to
regulate in ways that are not arbitrary and capricious, guided by
the dictates of Medicaid law, respective state plan documents, and
a keen appreciation of the parameters of programmatic efficacy
under waiver processes. Second, shifting back to federal obligation,
the collaborative administrative law initiatives-whether driven
by reforms in this area of law generally or by specific initiativeshould extend beyond matters that concern preemption and
encourage collaboration in all areas that have major impacts on
state and local operations. The Medicaid coercion claim in
National Federation does not raise a Supremacy Clause
preemption challenge per se, but in a practical sense it is about
both the viability of states meeting new fiscal mandates and
concern over programmatic control, which are somewhat
analogous to a preemption issue. The point is, however, that when
states have concerns about new federal mandates and oversight
efforts-particularly ones like those in ACA, which have serious
financial impacts-such concerns should trigger an EO 13,132
analysis, and federalism matters should be central to
policymaking and rulemaking in such contexts, preemption aside.
In the debate over coercion and Medicaid, the states' argued
in National Federationthat the relationship between Washington
and the states constitutes a contractual arrangement. 113 This
strong contract theory, accepted by the Court, contends that
legislation enacted pursuant to the General Welfare Clause is
contractual in nature. 114 Thus, in the parlance of contracts,
Medicaid participation is an agreement by participating states to
113. I. Glenn Cohen & James F. Blumstein, The Constitutionality of the
ACA's Medicaid-ExpansionMandate, 366 N. ENG. J. MED. 103 (2012).
114. National Federation, No.11-393, slip. op at 46, 47; see also Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345
(2008).
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meet federally imposed conditions in return for federal funds.
Taking the contract argument further, adherents of the contract
analogy argued that the ACA Medicaid expansion is a unilateral
revision of the agreement entered into by the states and is such a
dramatic change that it constitutes a breach of the federal-state
agreement. Although the equation of coercion to a breach is a
noteworthy parallel to contract law, until National Federation, it
did not appear to have garnered much support in the courts. Even
if the Medicaid is a type of contract between federal and state
government, at the end of the day it is a contract encased in the
borders of federal law, and, as problematic as it may be, it is
Congress that has the power to amend and revise federal law
without state permission.
The notion that Medicaid is informed and shaped by contract
as a lever to create intergovernmental balance and equitable
administration nevertheless should not be casually discarded as
judicial rhetoric. On the contrary, what needs to be identified is a
vehicle that can transform the presumptive contract from a de
facto agreement to an express agreement between the states and
federal government. This template could set out key measures of
dual responsibility, thereby directly addressing matters of
federalism. One model that has garnered recent attention is a
state compact, a type of contract that can be used to address
common state issues or matters that have intergovernmental
implications.1 1 5 Traditionally, states have employed compacts to
settle land disputes, but in the twentieth century states have
expanded
such agreements
to function
as regulatory,
administrative, and management tools. 16 Typically, interstate
compacts seek to establish an independent multistate government
authority (a commission), to develop uniform guidelines and
standards for members, to achieve economies of scale in reducing
administrative costs, and to devise some type of dispute resolution
mechanism.117 Based on Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the
Constitution, a compact carries with it the force of law and
obligates the parties to the agreement to meet its terms. A
compact is both contractual and statutory in nature, in that its
115. See The Health Care Compact, NAT'L CTR. FOR INTERSTATE COMPACTS,
http://apps.csg.org/ncic/PDF/Health%20Care%20Compact.pdf (last visited Apr.
12, 2012) (outlining the background of the health care compact). See generally

Herbert J. Naujoks, Compacts and Agreements Between States and Between
States and a Foreign Power, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 219 (1953) (discussing the
Compact Clause in regard to controversies involving the Great Lakes states).
116. CAROLINE N. BROUN ET AL., THE EVOLVING USE AND THE CHANGING
ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 9-12 (2006).

117. John J. Mountjoy, Corrections and Parole Trends in 2003: Interstate
Compacts: An Alternative for Solving Common Problems Among States, NAT'L
15,
2012),
visited
Apr.
CTS.
(last
FOR
ST.
CENTER
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_Parole_ Trends03.pdf.
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details unfold within the four corners of a given agreement, but
such agreements are limited by constitutional principles and
formed through special state laws, which require participating
jurisdictions to cede their sovereignty in a given area to a suprastate or sub-federal authority. In the event the federal government
is a participant in a compact, the parties must obtain
congressional approval, but an agreement involving only states
will prompt federal approval only if it extends into areas
traditionally within federal purview." 8
The idea of putting Medicaid into a federal-state compact to
better recognize and protect the interests of states appeals to
political conservatives who see it as a way to restore clarity in
federalism and return to the states control over Tenth Amendment
activities, such as health care."19 In their view, the compact is a
mechanism to end unilateral control by Washington and
implement a more collaborative framework within which to
develop policies and regulate intergovernmental programs. More
specifically, proponents of compacts cite four reasons in support of
such agreements: (1) they can better meet local and state needs;
(2) they can add predictability in terms of obligations and
enforcement; (3) they can address national considerations if
structured properly with federal consent; and (4) they can push
states to seek greater regional cooperation and afford state
signatories with an opportunity to work collectively in matters of
mutual interests, such as health policy.120 On the other hand,
there are considerable problems that must be confronted in
developing a compact, including the politics and logistics of
crafting a compact, the reluctance of federal and state parties to
cede authority to this middle entity, and the practical problems
that may arise in compliance and enforcement.121
Several state legislatures have enacted or are considering
laws directing their states to form a state health compact to
convert federal health regulatory programs, particularly Medicaid
and Medicare (but not the Veterans Affairs and Indian Health
Service programs), into block grants that would be paid by

118. Id.
119. See Jack McHugh, Health Care Compact Bill Would Shift Power Back
to the States, MACKINAC CENTER FOR PUB. POL'Y (Mar. 2,2012),
http://www.mackinac.org/ article.aspx?ID=16547&print=yes. This movement
appears to be a highly partisan initiative but is gaining certain traction
around the country, as now Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and
Utah have enacted compact bills, and others are being considered in a number
of other states, including Michigan, Minnesota, and Ohio. See generally
HEALTH CARE COMPACT, http://healthcarecompact.org (last visited Apr. 15,
2012).
120. Bagenstos, supra note 114.
121. Id. at 28.
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Washington and administered by the states. 122 A proposed
Minnesota bill, for example, articulates five core elements in the
health compact: (1) congressional approval of the arrangement; (2)
establishment of the primacy of state signatories for health
matters in their respective jurisdictions; (3) suspension of federal
laws and regulations inconsistent with state laws, with the fiscal
burden passing to states accordingly; (4) receipt of a consistent
annual mandatory spending amount from the federal government,
not subject to the vicissitudes of annual appropriations but
overseen by Congress and the General Accountability Office; and
(5) oversight of the compact by an interstate advisory
commission. 123
No doubt, the fact that a handful of states have enacted
compact laws speaks to their attractiveness in some jurisdictions.
There are, however, significant barriers to actualizing a regulatory
compact to transfer broad authority over both Medicaid and
Medicare to the states, from obtaining congressional approval to
garnering a true understanding of the financial implications of a
block-grant funding arrangement. Those generic barriers to
and
power-sharing
noted . previously-logistics,
compacts
enforcement-would all come home to roost in an ambitious
scheme to devolve health regulation to states, as well as broader
questions about equities of social policy left to the idiosyncrasies of
multiple jurisdictions. Presumably, the proponents of a compact
solution are aware of the practical barriers to implementation,
raising questions as to whether such enactments are more
philosophical expressions than practical policies. Furthermore, as
to Medicare and Medicaid specifically, both programs will be
reformed over time, and parts of Medicaid, particularly the dualeligible population, may be blended into Medicare. Wholesaler
transfer of these programs thus appears to be premature as well
as legally and bureaucratically problematic.
There is, however, a certain middle ground that could be
carved out with state compacts, which is less global and more
tailored to Medicaid and related health reform initiatives. This
alternative could be framed around an entity that seeks review
and consensus of broad policy initiatives involving reframing of
benefits, expansion and contraction of services, and development
of state innovations. 124 Conceivably, a compact for Medicaid could

122. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF UTAH (Feb. 24, 2012),
http://www.lwvutah.org/Legislative%20Updates/2012GeneralSession/Feb24.ht
ml (discussing the bill enacted in Utah).
123. Mountjoy, supra note 117.
124. Much of the cooperative work in Medicaid involves private
organizations, such as the National Association of State Medicaid Directors
and the National Conference of State Legislatures. See APHSA Health
Services
Division,
AM.
PUB.
HUM.
SERVS.
AsS'N,
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involve a working commission that would vet and approve some of
the major issues now on the states' and federal government's
radar, such as essential benefit determination, maintenance of
effort, managed care expansion, and community programming for
the aged and disabled. It is also conceivable that a national
Medicaid compact commission might serve as an accreditation
body, which would oversee the structure and operations of
signatory Medicaid programs.125 The terms of the Medicaid
compact could specify the scope of operations, governing authority,
procedures, and the extent of power that the states and federal
government alike would cede. This alternative compact thus would
create a formal structure for core decision making that cannot be
achieved via current informal mechanisms of dialogue, or through
federal agency control. Though such an arrangement has
significant implications for program financing and operations, its
goal would be better program collaboration, not necessarily
reinvention. Somewhat akin to a treaty, a state compact for
Medicaid would undoubtedly introduce oversight and operational
complexities that might prove frustrating to both states and
federal bureaucrats. 126 In the long term, however, this alternative
ideally would shape policies that would mitigate the current
challenges and allow future operations to be more responsive to
local needs and capacities.
Moving away from a national Medicaid compact is still a
lesser idea that ties into the tradition of health governance,
namely the use of a compact as a vehicle to create regional
cooperation around specific programs like Medicaid. Like the
regionalization of federal health programs through geographic
areas, compacts could be organized to foster cooperative structures
between federal authorities and state governments within a given
http://hsd.aphsa.org/Home/home-news.asps (last visited Apr. 15, 2012); NAT'L
AsS'N OF MEDICAID DIRECTORS, http://medicaiddirectors.org/ (last visited Apr.
15, 2012); NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ (last visited
Apr. 15, 2012) (evidencing the cooperative work that takes place among
private organizations).
125. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners performs
accreditation of state insurance departments on a private level and could
certainly fall within the orbit of a compact commission. An accreditation
process, moreover, could establish standards that would enhance the viability
of bureaucratic operations and staff performance and training. See Financial
Regulation Standards and Accreditation Program, NAT'L ASS'N OF INS.
http://www.naic.org/documents/
COMM'RS,(2012),
committees fFRSA~pamphlet.pdf.
126. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Treaty Series, No.
at
available
331,
at
1155
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/ 1_1_1969.pdf
(Jan. 27, 1980) (discussing a treaty on treaties that demonstrates the
complexity and ongoing governance challenges which are confronted in
administering such legal arrangements).
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region. 127 Unlike the regionalism of DHHS, however, regional state
compacts could serve as legal entities to assume roles in distinct
areas, from policy development to program administration.
Moreover, states in a regional compact would cede Medicaid
operations to regional authorities, which would become suprastates and assume the collective role of member states. Certainly,
collectivizing the FMAP match would be contentious, but such
collectivization might open an opportunity to apply a block-grant
concept that would not yield as many variations in coverage as
application of this mechanism on a state level. 128 Depending on the
scope of regional authority, the future of individual state health
reform initiatives would need to be harmonized with
regionalization efforts, but if state reforms such as the ones in
Massachusetts and Utah are compelling enough, they might serve
as the foundation for regional expansion as well. 129 A more
immediate regionalization might occur across states in the context
of ACA, as the law allows health insurance exchanges and
insurance cooperatives to exist across state lines. A regional
health insurance exchange indeed might be an ideal vehicle to
develop meaningful cooperation between groups of states and the
federal government. Furthermore, it would lend itself to a compact
agreement that would serve as a foundation on which to build a
more expansive set of shared responsibilities. 130
VI.

CONCLUSION

Medicaid, the nation's largest federal-state matching
program, lies at the epicenter of federalism and represents the
complexities of dual sovereignty at the intersections of law,
economics, and health delivery. Dramatic Medicaid expansion is
pivotal to the success of ACA, potentially adding twenty million
new enrollees and in so doing expanding coverage to a new
127. See HHS Region Map, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
http://www.hhs.gov/about/regionmap.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012)
(displaying the regions of the Department of Health and Human Services).
128. John Holahan & Alan Weil, Block Grants Are the Wrong Prescription
INST.,
URB.
Medicaid,
for
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/900624_hponline_6.pdf (last visited Apr.
15, 2012).
129. Emily Berry, How States Will Shape Health Reform, AM. MED. NEWS
(Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2011/08/29/bisaO829.htm.
130. At present, only thirteen states and the District of Columbia have
plans in place for a health insurance exchange. If states fail to create an
exchange, that task reverts to the federal government. It may be far more
productive for Washington to encourage regional exchanges that bring a
number of states to the bureaucratic table than to try to run such a program
external to the states. See Linda Blumberg, Multi-State Health Insurance
2011),
(April
INSTITUTE
URBAN
Exchanges,
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412325-Multi-state-Health-InsuranceExchanges.pdf.
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category of recipient: poor, childless adults. Political and economic
pressures have pushed the federal government toward more
conciliatory policies toward state Medicaid programs, but the
fundamental structures of the program bounded by law and
expanding coverage requirements rest on an increasingly fragile
foundation of dual governance. The coercion claim mounted by the
states in National Federation,largely dismissed, underscores the
vitality of dual sovereignty, and underscores the need for
fundamental reforms in intergovernmental health relations. This
piece highlights two possible approaches that should be considered
the Medicaid federal-state relationship:
in rebalancing
strengthening collaboration with states through actualization of
EO 13,312 and the use of state compacts for dual governance in
areas central to Medicaid operations. Unquestionably, Medicaid
plays a critical role in American health care. If it is to meet the
needs of a growing and diverse constituency, it must evolve in
ways that meet population needs, and such evolution will require
creative redesign of both programmatic elements and fundamental
governance structures.

